What does the motto of this year’s Meeting Brno festival, “Do We Belong to Each Other?” mean to you?
When you look at Central Europe, we all have conflicts among ourselves. Central Europe is a very dangerous region. We still have this idea of ourselves as white doves. But consider that during World War II, for every ten Jews living in Germany, seven survived, while nearly none of the ten Jews here survived. We are a very dangerous part of Europe, yet here are two nations that have never fought each other and have clearly defined borders. This was determined by history, because we were part of the Kingdom of Hungary for 880 years, and you were part of the Austrian monarchy for 400 years. So, we never had territorial claims—nothing. On the contrary, we always helped each other, and that’s a miracle.
We had disputes and conflicts with the Poles (and still do). To the south, we have Hungary, which has never been romantic, to put it diplomatically. To the east, we either had Subcarpathian Ukraine, or we didn’t, but there was always a problem. You Czechs are surrounded by the Germanic world. It’s not simple here, and I greatly appreciate that our two nations have always helped each other. For example, when we were behind, you were in NATO and we were not. You helped us tremendously so that we could join the European Union with you. We must not forget that.
You often talk about being key allies for Central European stability. What do you think we could do to strengthen this alliance?
I think you in the Czech Republic should stop being against the euro. Because if you don’t become part of the next integration process in Europe, we’ll grow apart. We’re sitting in the middle, and you’re on the corridor. And you’re waiting for us to agree. This is not a good situation. You need to realize that the euro is not just a very stable world currency. You must also realize that once you have the euro in your pocket, your nationalists lose their power. With your small national currency, they can do whatever they want. We have the advantage that our governments cannot manipulate finances as much because we have the European Central Bank. So, this is, I would say, a very practical matter. And it will also fix the kind of Euroscepticism that your unnamed president has instilled. I still feel it in my students, in the younger generation. You have it inside you.
But above all, I bet on the fact that there have always been times when we helped each other. In the 18th century, the breakup of the monarchy in 1918, Versailles in 1921—if it hadn’t been for Czechoslovakia, who knows what would have happened. We probably wouldn’t exist anymore, but you helped us. Then, out of gratitude, we kicked you out of Slovakia in 1939. But that’s something—I’ve probably apologized for that three times already. But we’ve always helped each other. When we fell into Pan-Slavism, which was largely conceived by Slovak thinkers like Ján Kollár and Jozef Šafárik, you had the critical mind of Karel Havlíček Borovský, who went to Russia. Unfortunately, our Pan-Slavists never went to Russia. Slovak Pan-Slavism is a dream of Russia that never existed. And that continues to this day.
When people say Russia would be great, I ask: where do you go for vacation in Russia? And they start laughing. Even though they had previously told me Russia was their dream, they laugh. They find it absurd to go to Russia for a vacation. I asked why. I’ve been to Yalta, Sochi, Mariupol. I know the place. Why don’t you go there if it’s your dream? Their Pan-Slavism is passive. It means: let us dream of something that doesn’t exist. So, within Czechoslovakia, you kept us a bit grounded. But in 1946, we voted for the Democrats, and you voted for the Communists. We balance each other out, but together, we are stronger.
Meeting Brno is about finding dialogue, even when it’s difficult. What do you think are the difficult topics between Czechs and Slovaks?
As I said, we don’t have border problems. We’ve never occupied each other’s territories, and we’ve always been culturally separated. There were attempts to create a Czechoslovak language, just as there was Serbo-Croatian in Yugoslavia, but it never worked.
On the contrary, you helped us modernize the grammar. So, if you don’t have these issues, then you really shouldn’t have any. You don’t have anything to argue about. You cooperate.
So, between Czechs and Slovaks, there aren’t really any difficult topics, or not big ones?
No. The difficult topics now are, for example, the reemerging Beneš decrees. And that’s a common problem for us, because it’s still a Czechoslovak problem. That’s why cooperation in the Visegrád Group is so important. Not only did Beneš have decrees, but Polish Bierut also had decrees. And if the Germans remembered Bierut’s decrees, it would be a huge problem. A Sudeten German association in Germany once brought it up, and immediately, Minister Schäuble came on a wheelchair and said, “This will never happen again.” So the Poles actually said no. Neither Bierut’s nor Beneš’s decrees will be dealt with in the Visegrád Group. I was a witness to that. So, I consider, contrary to your new president, the Visegrád Group to be very important. It is, after all, the first time these four nations are speaking openly.
Although we were all under Moscow’s rule, we didn’t have communication channels. Moscow didn’t allow us to be connected by highways, electrified trains, or even gas or oil pipelines. If you look at an old map, everything went from Russia. There was no connection between us. We really weren’t allowed to talk about the problems we were facing. So, I consider the Visegrád Group, contrary to President Pavel, to be very important. Even if we don’t agree on everything now, we’ll wait.
You were one of the people who actively tried to prevent the breakup of Czechoslovakia. Do you think, in hindsight, that there were ways to turn it around?
I may be an old lady, but I don’t have a crystal ball. I don’t know. In February 1992, I wrote a letter to Václav Havel saying that Czechoslovakia would break up. He got really mad at me. He scolded me a lot, but then he understood that I was right. I was in Vienna, a direct witness to how Yugoslavia was splitting up and how bloody it ended. Then, in 1991, the Soviet Union dissolved peacefully. That was a miracle. I consider Russia’s war on Ukraine today as a delayed reaction to the breakup of the Soviet Union. Czechoslovakia broke up. There was something fragile about it because it was created very quickly. Notice that the first thing Hitler did was dissolve Czechoslovakia. In 1968, the Slovaks said, “First, let’s have autonomy, then democracy.” That federal arrangement was the first step toward the breakup of Czechoslovakia. So, there was something fragile about it. Maybe it was the fact that we were together for less than 80 years.
But despite everything, I considered maintaining Czechoslovakia important because I felt in Austria or Bavaria the forces that wanted the breakup. In 1948, Czechoslovakia was one of the top ten richest and most developed countries in the world. Other countries were not happy that it existed. They wanted to weaken us, and they did. I think the basis of Austria’s anti-nuclear stance against our nuclear plants was to weaken Czechoslovakia. Now it’s being shown to be complete nonsense, even paid for by Russian Gazprom. When I was sitting in Vienna, I felt that Czechoslovakia was like a huge boulder on Austria’s chest.
I was quite rightfully afraid that the force that was going to tear apart Czechoslovakia would throw Slovakia to the East, and that almost happened. There was a plan by Primakov, who was the Russian prime minister at the time, who looked at the map and said, “If Slovakia remained a wedge of Russian influence in Central Europe, that would be nice.” Can you imagine that? Slovakia would have been today’s Belarus. That was a huge danger. We had to organize all possible forces to turn it around. Back then, we managed to get 86% of first-time voters to vote, the younger generation. Mečiar won, but he couldn’t form a majority in parliament. That then triggered two Dzurinda governments, and you and the Poles helped us open NATO for the second time, which the Americans and British initially didn’t want. That was a very dangerous situation. And the fact that we are with you and not another Belarus today is a miracle. For me, as a witness to those times, it’s a miracle.
